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Abstract—
We propose WedgeChain, a data store that spans both edge
and cloud nodes (an edge-cloud system). WedgeChain consists
of a logging layer and a data indexing layer. In this study, we
encounter two challenges: (1) edge nodes are untrusted and po-
tentially malicious, and (2) edge-cloud coordination is expensive.
WedgeChain tackles these challenges by the following proposals:
(1) Lazy (asynchronous) certification: where data is committed at
the untrusted edge and then lazily certified at the cloud node. This
lazy certification method takes advantage of the observation that
an untrusted edge node is unlikely to act maliciously if it knows it
will be detected (and punished) eventually. Our lazy certification
method guarantees that malicious acts (i.e., lying) are eventually
detected. (2) Data-free certification: our lazy certification method
only needs to send digests of data to the cloud—instead of sending
all data to the cloud—which enables saving network and cloud
resources and reduce costs. (3) LSMerkle: we extend a trusted
index (mLSM [32]) to enable indexing data at the edge while
utilizing lazy and data-free certification.
I. INTRODUCTION
To support processing this huge volume of data in edge and
IoT applications, the data management solution must be capa-
ble of fast data ingestion at the edge—closer to data sources.
This is critical for two reasons: (1) many applications require
real-time processing—such as interactive mobile applications
and time-critical processing in Industry 4.0 and autonomous
vehicles. (2) many applications—such as large-scale video
analytics and smart city applications—produce huge amounts
of data at a large number of locations that would lead to
increased costs for cloud communication and computation.
However, processing data at the edge is complicated by the
following challenges: (1) Edge nodes are untrusted. This is
because the edge node might be operated by a third-party
provider outside of the administrative domain of the data
owner. This can also be due to inexpensive or unmanaged edge
nodes being more susceptible to malicious breaches. (2) Edge-
cloud coordination is expensive in terms of latency (round-trip
times are in the order of 100s of milliseconds to seconds) and
bandwidth (applications pay for data transfer costs between the
data center and the Internet). This means that relying on trusted
nodes—in a trusted cloud or private cloud in the administrative
domain of the owner—to authenticate the data is expensive,
and thus must be left out of the execution path of requests and
only utilized for asynchronous tasks.
In this paper, we propose WedgeChain, an edge-cloud data
store that provides both logging and indexing of data for edge
and IoT applications. WedgeChain enables both an efficient
and trusted data storage and access. In WedgeChain, the
system model consists of authenticated clients that produce
data and send signed copies of the data to untrusted edge
nodes. The edge nodes service data access requests in coor-
dination with a trusted private cloud node that ensures that
untrusted edge nodes are not acting maliciously by providing
an inconsistent view of data1 In WedgeChain, we propose the
following three features:
(1) Lazy (asynchronous) certification enables committing
directly at the untrusted edge node and then asynchronously
verifying with the cloud node that an edge node did not act ma-
liciously. Specifically, the role of the cloud node is to prevent
edge nodes from giving inconsistent views of the system to
different clients. If an edge node is caught giving inconsistent
views, then it is punished. The way WedgeChain implements
this feature is by making the untrusted edge node provide
a signed message to the client that the data is committed.
This signed message is used by the client to prove that the
edge node lied in case the data was not actually committed.
Our observation is that in edge-cloud environments, nodes
identities are known (e.g., an edge node belongs to an IT
department). Therefore, an untrusted edge node would not act
maliciously if it knows that it will be caught and punished. The
punishment should be severe enough to outweigh the benefit
of the malicious act.
(2) Data-free certification allows the certification at the
cloud to be performed using the data’s digest which is smaller
than the data being certified. This allows reducing the size
of edge-cloud communication. This is possible because agree-
ment on the digest of data translates to agreement on the data
itself if the digest is a one-way hash function.
(3) LSMerkle implements a fast-ingestion trusted index at
edge nodes that utilizes the lazy and data-free certification
strategies of WedgeChain. We integrate a new kind of
indexing structures—called mLSM [32]—that combines the
design features of LSM trees [24], [29] (used for high-velocity
ingestion) and Merkle trees [25] (used for trusted data storage
and access.) LSMerkle uses mLSM as a data structure, re-
placing the memory component with a WedgeChain log/buffer
and building the edge-cloud protocol around it to update and
compact the mLSM structure in cooperation with the cloud
node. (This integration is needed for key-value operations
1In the remainder of the paper, the terms cloud and trusted cloud refer to
a private cloud that is in the administrative domain of the application owner.
only; WedgeChain logging data operations do not require the
integration of a Merkle tree structure.)
In the rest of this paper, we present background in Sec-
tion II. Then, we present the model and design of WedgeChain
and LSMerkle in Sections III to V. An experimental evaluation
is presented in Section VI followed by a related work discus-
sion in Section VII. The paper concludes in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Target Use Cases
We target edge, IoT, and mobile applications where data is
generated in huge volumes and/or have workloads with real-
time requirements. Applications with real-time requirements,
sending data to be processed to a potentially faraway cloud
node is infeasible as it can take hundreds of milliseconds to
seconds to receive a response (not counting the time to process
the data). For example, interactive mobile applications—such
as Virtual and Augmented Reality-based applications—require
a latency of only tens of milliseconds, which gives enough
time to process the frames and leave no time for wide-
area communication. This is also the case for mission-critical
applications in Industry 4.0 and autonomous vehicles.
In this paper, we use the term edge to represent any type
of resources that are close to users and sources of data. Edge
devices range from the client’s personal devices (e.g., a router
or cluster of nodes in a building or university campus) to
third-party providers of edge data center technology, such as
micro and mobile data centers. The range of these resources
are sometimes referred to as mobile-edge computing, fog
computing, and edge computing.
The challenge with leveraging edge infrastructure is that
edge resources—in many cases—are not in the same control
domain as the application owner and client and thus might
be untrusted. For example, consider a smart traffic application
where a state government is monitoring traffic to provide better
routes and traffic signals to vehicles and traffic controls such
as traffic lights and ramp meters. The data in this application
includes information from sensors and cameras that are placed
around the city as well as government-owned or contracted
public transport. The state government (the owner of the
application) has access to the government data center that
is faraway from the city (it is typical for data centers to be
placed in remote areas.) Therefore, the application utilize edge
resources at the city to enable fast response to traffic conditions
(e.g., reacting swiftly to a traffic accident to reroute and change
the flow in ramps).
Although the application owner might have access to data
sources and traffic sensors around the city, it does not have
compute resources that are capable of data storage and pro-
cessing at the scale of this application. Therefore, it utilizes
edge machines that are operated by other entities outside of
the owner’s administrative domain. This includes one or more
of the following: (1) third-party edge service providers that
rent out compute resources close to the city. (2) Independent
contractors such as private transportation companies that may
integrate their vehicles with edge resources to act as mobile
edge resources. Both these types of edge resources (edge
service providers and independent contractors) are untrusted
by the application owner. Therefore, there is a need to maintain
the integrity of the data.
This direction of utilizing edge resource providers is now
starting to manifest as services provided by various entities
including public cloud providers. For example, Amazon AWS
services such as Amazon Wavelength [3] are partnering with
telecommunication providers such as Verizon, Vodafone, and
SK telecom to allow Amazon AWS cloud compute to be
hosted on their edge resources (e.g., cellular towers and 5G in-
frastructure). Similarly, Microsoft Azure partnered with AT&T
for the same purpose [1]. (This corresponds to edge providers
in the example above.) Similarly, other cloud services (such
as Amazon AWS IoT Greengrass [2]) allow customers to
deploy cloud functions on the customer’s edge devices. In
these types of applications, operations on user’s edge devices
must be performed in a trusted manner. (This corresponds to
independent contractors in the example above.)
Figure 1(a) shows an example of an edge-cloud deployment.
Clients access the data or generate data from their devices and
send data to the WedgeChain data system that consists of edge
nodes and a cloud node. There are two types of data requests.
The first is for data logging and streaming requests, which
consists of add() and read() operations. The other type of
data access is for key-value requests, which consists of put()
and get() key-value operations.
Each edge node handles the storage and processing for a
subset of the clients (i.e., a partition of the data). Specifically,
each client is associated with a single partition/edge node.
Thus, finding the data that pertains to a client is done by
directing the request to its corresponding client. Due to the
spatial locality of edge applications, we focus on single-
partition operations in this work. Edge nodes can be edge and
micro datacenters or user devices. The cloud node maintains
the rest of the application’s data (and potentially a backup of
a subset of the data on edge nodes). It also helps edge nodes
in certifying data and running maintenance tasks.
B. Relevant Technologies
1) LSM Trees: Log-Structured Merge (LSM) Trees are
designed to support fast ingestion of data. LSM trees batch
updates in pages and merge them with the rest of the data
later. This moves merging the data out of the execution path
of updates, hence making ingestion more efficient. There are
many LSM tree variants [24], [29]. In general, the tree is
structured into L levels. Level 0 is where new pages are
appended and is maintained in main memory. Once the number
of pages in Level 0 exceeds a threshold, then the pages are
merged with the next level, Level 1. Levels 1 and higher
are persisted in storage. Each level has a threshold, when
exceeded, pages are merged with the next level. The details
of these operations and structure vary across designs [24].
2) Merkle Trees: Merkle trees [25] allow an untrusted node
to serve data in a trusted way. Specifically, it allows the
untrusted node to provide a proof of the authenticity of the data




Fig. 1: An overview of the use-case, edge-cloud baseline, and
architecture of WedgeChain.
way Merkle trees are usually designed is by dividing the data
into pages. Then, Each page is hashed with a cryptographic
hashing function. The hashes of the pages represent the leaves
of the Merkle tree. Then, each pair of leaf nodes are hashed
to construct a node at the next level of the Merkle tree. This
is continued until there is only a single node in a level.
This node is called the Merkle root. A trusted entity (e.g.,
the trusted cloud node in our case) signs the Merkle root to
certify the authenticity of the data. The untrusted node uses
this signed Merkle root to provide a proof to clients that the
data is authentic. In this work, we leverage Authenticated Data
Structures such as Merkle Trees to enable key-value access
to data from untrusted edge nodes. However, these structures
are not needed for logging data operations which utilize lazy
(asynchronous) trust directly.
C. Baseline Solutions and Their Drawbacks
Given the use case and relevant technologies introduced in
this section, it is possible to come up with a straight-forward
solution for edge-cloud data management with untrusted edge
nodes. We call this edge-baseline and show it in Figure 1(b).
Specifically, clients send their add() and put() requests to the
(trusted) cloud node. Then, the cloud node regenerates the
Merkle tree to account for the new updates, sign the Merkle
root, and send the Merkle tree to the untrusted edge node. This
enables the edge node to serve data access requests by using
the signed Merkle root as proof of the data’s authenticity.
However, this straight-forward solution has a drawback.
Whenever data needs to be logged (using add) or inserted
into the data structure (using put), the cloud node is in the
path of execution. Our proposal WedgeChain overcomes these
limitation by employing a lazy (asynchronous) certification
strategy that takes the cloud node out of the execution path of
add and put operations—see Figure 1(c). In WedgeChain, data
access requests are served immediately from the edge nodes
without having to wait for the cloud node to certify the data.
To make sure that the edge node does not lie, the edge node
provides a temporary proof in its response. This temporary
proof can be used later by the client to detect if the edge node
lied. If the edge node lied to the client, then the client can use
the temporary proof it received to prove that the edge node is
malicious and thus is able to punish the malicious node.
D. Security Model Assumptions
Our lazy certification method is enabled by observing that
some security model characteristics of existing systems can be
relaxed in applications of edge-cloud systems with a hybrid
trust model. Specifically, we make the following assumptions
about the security model (and how they are reflected in the
smart traffic application we presented above):
1. The application owner can enforce a punishment that would
deter untrusted edge nodes from committing malicious acts. In
the smart traffic application, for example, this assumption can
hold by enforcing a monetary and/or legal punishment. For
both edge service providers and independent contractors, since
they are known entities, the application owner can enforce the
punishment.
2. The application can prevent an untrusted node that acted
maliciously before from reentering as an edge node. In the
smart traffic application, because the real identities of both
edge providers and independent contractors are knows, and
they cannot fabricate new identities, the application owner can
prevent their reentry.
3. Malicious acts cannot lead to catastrophic consequences.
This condition can be trivially satisfied by handling critical
operation that can be catastrophic at the cloud. The definition
of catastrophic depends on the application. In our smart
traffic application, for instance, destroying the data at an edge
location might not be deemed catastrophic as the application
state depends on the collective information of a large number
of sensors/cameras and the small potential of nodes acting
maliciously (due to assumption 1 above) outweighs the inac-
curacy and potential lost of information.
III. SYSTEM AND DATA MODEL
The system consists of three types of nodes: (1) cloud
nodes that are trusted (non-byzantine). Each cloud node can
be backed by a high-availability cluster for availability. For
ease of exposition, however, we assume that there is one
cloud node. The role of the cloud node is to ensure that edge
nodes are not providing an inconsistent view of data to clients.
(2) edge nodes that are not trusted. An edge node receives
data from clients and stores it locally in the form of a log
or index. It also receives requests to access stored data from
clients. (3) clients are authenticated nodes that generate and
consume data from edge nodes and devices. The generated
data is signed and sent to edge nodes for processing.
Each edge node maintains a log that pertains to a subset of
clients (edge devices). For example, in an application with IoT
sensors, each edge node maintains the data generated by a set
of the IoT sensors (i.e., clients). Also, each client belong to a
single partition on a single edge node. Each block is a batch
of data entries. Clients may read a block by issuing a request
with the block’s id to the edge node. Block ids are unique
monotonic numbers that are assigned by the edge node (the ids
are unique relative to an edge nodes, but are not unique across
edge nodes.) In addition to the log, each node may maintain an
index data structure. We present more details about the index
data structure in Section V.
IV. WEDGECHAIN LOGGING
In this section, we present WedgeChain and the detailed
design of the logging component. In Section V, we present
the indexing component.
A. Logging Interface
The edge node’s interface consists of the following calls (all
message exchanges are signed by the sender):
• add(in: entry, out: bid, (optional) block): this call adds
an entry to the next block at the edge. The edge node
returns the block id (bid) that contains the entry. If
requested, the edge node returns the newly formed block
that contains the entry.
• read(in: bid, out: block, bid, proof): this function takes
a block id number as input and returns the corresponding
block in addition to a proof of the authenticity of the
block. This proof might be either (1) in-progress (Phase
I) or (2) final (Phase II). More details about proofs and
commit phases later in the section.
Each of these logging operations is performed on a single
block, independent of prior blocks. The cloud node ensures
that untrusted edge nodes are not giving an inconsistent view
of the blocks. Because logging operations operate at the level
of single blocks, the detection of malicious behavior by the
cloud can operate at the level of single independent blocks as
well. This limits the type of stateful operations running on the
log. For this reason, we also present a key-value operations
that maintain state across blocks in Section V.
B. WedgeChain Overview
Guarantees. The main goal of WedgeChain is to support
adding to and reading from the edge node’s log while guar-
anteeing validity and agreement. Validity is a guarantee that
an entry in the log is one that has been proposed by a client.
Agreement is a guarantee that any two nodes reading the same
block will observe the same content.
Lazy (Asynchronous) Certification. Lazy certification dis-
tinguishes between two types of commitments: initial commit
(Phase I Commit) and final commit (Phase II Commit). Initial
commit is the commitment done without involving the trusted
cloud node. Instead, the untrusted edge node provides a
temporary proof to the client. This temporary proof can be
used by the client later to prove that the edge node promised
to add the entry to a specific block. Therefore, a malicious
edge node can be detected and punished. The final commit
phase is when the trusted cloud node authenticates the request
either ensuring that the edge node did not lie in its response
or proving that it lied and should be punished.
Initial (Phase I) Commit is Sufficient to Make Progress.
The ability to detect malicious behavior allows a client to com-
mit immediately and make progress after Phase I commit. This
is because an untrusted edge node does not have an incentive
to lie since it knows that it will eventually be detected. This
assumes that the harm of the penalties/punishments that would
be applied to a malicious edge node outweigh the benefit of
the malicious activity.
Coordination Pattern (Phase I Commit). In the rest of
this section, we cover how WedgeChain enables adding and
reading from a single edge node’s log. Consider a scenario
with a client c, an edge node e, and a cloud node L. The
client c can be an IoT sensor or edge device that generates
data continuously. Assume that c sends all its data to e for
it to be stored in its log. Client c sends an add request to e
to add entries. Upon receiving the add request, e batches the
client’s sent entry, m, with other requests to be committed as
part of the next block. Once a block is ready, the block id and
the block containing the entry m are returned to the client c.
At this time, the entry and block are Phase I Committed.
Coordination Pattern (Phase II Commit). Concurrently,
the edge node e sends the digest of the block (that contains
both the content and the block id) to the cloud node L. The
digest must be constructed using a one-way hash function.
Then, L sends back a message that contains the signed digest
of block bid if it is the first time it receives a digest for block
bid. Otherwise, the cloud node detects a malicious activity
and rejects the request. The signed message from L acts as
a certification that this is the block digest that is committed.
The cloud node also maintains the digests of all committed
blocks of edge nodes. At this time, the entry and the block
are Phase II Committed.
Data-Free Coordination. Note that the edge node only
needs to send the digest (constructed with a one-way hash
function) to the cloud node during Phase II Commit. This is
beneficial because it reduces the edge-cloud communication
overhead. Data-free coordination is possible because the digest
is used as a proxy of the actual content of the data. Therefore,
if all clients agree on the committed digest d of a block B,
then they also agree on the content of the block B.
Certification. A digest that is accepted and signed by the
cloud node is called a certified digest and the corresponding
block is called a certified block. A client can ensure that its
entry is Phase II Committed by checking whether the block
it received got certified by the cloud node. This can be done
by contacting the cloud node directly or asking the edge node
to forward the signed digest. This certification also guarantees
agreement, since an edge node cannot certify two different
blocks as Phase II committed with the same block id.
Reads. The signed digest is also used to certify reads. When
a read request is sent to the edge node, the edge node responds
with the block and the signed digest (denoted proof in the
interface). The client can then verify the authenticity of the
block by computing the digest and comparing it to the proof.
For blocks that are not yet certified by the cloud node, the edge
node may utilize lazy certification and send the block and an
empty proof. The client will get the certification from the cloud
node eventually and can detect whether the edge node was
malicious, similar to the case of the add interface. If the edge
node lied in its response, then the client can show the response
to the read request as a proof and thus punish the edge node.









Fig. 2: An example of the coordination necessary to add and read
blocks in WedgeChain.
Algorithm 1: Client algorithm to add an entry.
1: on AddNewEntry (in: entry) {
2: Send add($entry) to edge node
3: $block, $bid ← edge node response
4: Verify that the entry is in $block
5: Mark $entry as Phase I Committed
6: Wait until block-proof is received
7: $blockProof ← block-proof message from cloud node
8: Verify that digest($block&$id) = $blockProof
9: Mark add as Phase II Committed
10: }
This ability to prove maliciousness would deter malicious
activity and enable clients to consider the add committed with
high certainty even before Phase II Commitment.
C. Example
Consider a scenario (Figure 2) with two clients, cw and cr,
an edge node, and a cloud node. Initially, cw sends the data
entry m0 to the edge node. The edge node creates a block
b0 with m0 in its payload. Then, it sends the signed block
and its id back to cw. Client cw uses this response to termi-
nates its Phase I Commit and continues operation while lazy
certification is performed in the background. Asynchronously,
the edge node sends the digest of b0 to the cloud node to be
certified (Note that only the digest need to be sent, not the
whole block.) While the edge node is waiting for the cloud
node, the other client, cr, sends a request to read b0. The edge
node responds with the content of b0 but with no certification
from the cloud (called blockproof in the figure). Client cr uses
this response to terminates its Phase I Commit and continues
operation. Afterward, the certification is sent from the cloud
node to the edge node for b0. The edge node forwards the
certification (called blockproof in the figure) to both cw and
cr, which terminates their Phase II Commit.
D. Algorithms
1) Adding to the log: The following are the algorithms to
add a block to the edge node’s log.
Client algorithm (Algorithm 1). The client constructs an
add message that contains the data it wants to add to the
log. In our model, the client—which represents an IoT sensor
or edge device—is authenticated. To trust the add message,
the client includes a signature. The client sends the signed
add message to the (untrusted) edge node. Then, it waits
until it hears a response from the edge node that contains
the contents and block id of the block that contains the added
entry. This response is signed from the edge node (This is
important since the client can use this signed response in the
event of a dispute to punish the malicious node.) The client
verifies that its entry—that corresponds to the add request—is
part of the block.
After hearing the add-response message from the edge
node and verifying its contents, the client marks the corre-
sponding add request as a Phase I Commit. This Phase I
Commit represents the following guarantee:
Definition 1: (Phase I Commit Guarantee) If an entry is
Phase I Committed in block bid, then that implies that either
(1) the entry is part of block bid or, otherwise, (2) the client
can successfully prove that the edge node is malicious and
thus the edge node would be punished.
Eventually, the client receives a block-proof message from
the cloud node—that might be forwarded by the edge node.
The block-proof message is signed by the cloud node to
ensure its authenticity. It contains the block id, bid, and its
corresponding digest. Upon receiving this message, the client
marks the add request as a Phase II Commit which guarantees:
Definition 2: (Phase II Commit Guarantee) If an entry is
Phase II Committed in block bid, then this means that the edge
node cannot report another block for this block id as Phase
II Committed. Therefore, it is impossible for two clients to
disagree about the content of a block if their operations on it
were both Phase II Committed.
Edge node algorithm. When an edge node receives an add
request, it verifies the authenticity of the message by checking
the signature and that it belongs to a certified client. Then, it
adds it to a buffer. Once the buffer is full, a new block is
constructed with the entries in the buffer and appended to
the log. Then, the edge node constructs an add-response
message for each entry in the block (the add-response
messages can be aggregated and sent together if they belong
to the same client.) The add-response message is signed by
the edge node and includes the block and block id. These
messages are then sent to the corresponding clients.
After adding the block to the log, the edge node sends a
signed block-certify message to the cloud node that contains
the block id and block digest. The cloud node sends back a
signed block-proof message with the block id and digest. The
edge node forwards the block-proof message to all clients that
added entries in the corresponding block.
Cloud node algorithm. The cloud node receives a signed
block-certify request from an edge node that contains the
block id and digest. It verifies that it did not hear any prior
requests to certify a block with the same block id. If it is
the first, then it sends back the block-proof message with
the block id and digest. Otherwise, it flags the edge node as
malicious.
2) Reading from the log: The following are the algorithms
to read a block.
Client algorithm. To read a block, a client sends a read
request with the block id that it wishes to read to the edge
node. There are three cases:
1. The block is not available: The edge node responds with
a signed message saying that the block is not available. At
this point, if the client is suspicious that the edge node is
malicious and lying about the unavailability of the block,
it can send a request to the cloud node asking whether
the block was reported.
2. Phase II Commit read: A signed response that includes
the block and a proof. The proof is a block-proof message
that has been signed by the cloud node. The client verifies
the block-proof and terminates the read.
3. Phase I Commit read: A signed response that includes
the block but without a proof. In this case, the client waits
for a block-proof to be sent from the cloud node. After
receiving the response, but before receiving the block-
proof, the read is considered Phase I Committed. The
client can successfully dispute the read response in the
case it turns out that the edge node lied in its initial
response. Once the block-proof is received, the read is
considered Phase II Committed.
Edge node algorithm. When an edge node receives a read
request, it checks whether the requested block is available. If
it is not, then the edge node responds negatively. Otherwise,
the edge node responds with the block. If a block-proof is
available, then it is sent with the block. Otherwise, an empty
proof is sent. Eventually, when a block-proof is received from
the cloud node, the edge node forwards it to the client.
E. Security Threats
Replay attacks. A replay attack is performed by the mali-
cious edge node repeating a valid client request more than
once. To overcome this attack, existing techniques can be
integrated without incurring extra communication overhead to
the cloud. The choice depends on the what the application
permits. Specifically, in many edge applications, requests are
idempotent which means that applying the request more than
once has the same effect as applying it once, e.g., a sensor
indicating that the temperature reading is x at timestamp ts
has the same effect when repeated. Generalization of this using
timestamps, session ids, and prior state (i.e., explicitly defining
the prior state in the request) can all be integrated from the
client-side without affecting WedgeChain. WedgeChain can
also be extended to provide support to make any arbitrary
request idempotent. This can be done by making each request
signed by the client for a specific log position. Specifically, the
client first reserves a log position via a round of messaging
with the edge node. Then, the client signs the request with
the reserved log position. Because the request is signed for
a specific log position, any other client would not accept the
request if it is in another log position. This design does not
lead to extra edge-cloud communication. Also, the reservations
can be mandatory (the block waits for all reserved requests)
or best-effort (if some reserved requests are late, then they are
discarded, and the client has to do another reservation.)
Omission attacks. A malicious edge node might respond
negatively to a read request of a log position that is actually
filled (either to delay the response or because data was
maliciously destroyed). Minimizing the effect of this omission
attack can be performed by asynchronous gossip propagation
from the cloud node to clients (either through the edge node
or directly from the cloud node). These gossip messages are
signed by the cloud node with a timestamp and the log size
as of that timestamp. A client can use these gossip messages
to know that all log positions smaller than the log size are
filled. This still leaves the opportunity for omission attacks on
recent data. The time-window of this threat is a function of
the frequency of gossip messages. (We also discuss omission
attacks as they pertain to key-value operations in Section V-D.)
Disputes. A dispute can arise if the client discovers that
the edge node has lied in its response. There are malicious
acts that can be detected trivially, such as responding with a
digest that does not match the block or signing with the wrong
signature. Other than these types of malicious acts, an edge
node might respond to an add or read request with incorrect
information that cannot be immediately detected:
1. add-response: the edge node responds that the entry is
going to be in block i, but then the actual certified block
i does not include the entry.
2. read-response: the edge node responds with block i
and no proof, but it turns out the block is not the one
committed with id i.
In both cases, the client discovers the malicious act after the
call has entered Phase II Commit. Because the edge node lied
about the content of the block, it cannot provide the block-
proof message, since it must be signed from the cloud node.
The client waits for the block-proof message. If it does not
receive it for a predefined time threshold, it sends a request to
the cloud node with the block id and digest. The cloud node
detects that the digest does not match what is reported by the
edge node. In such a case, the edge node is punished.
A dispute can also be sent if an omission attack is detected
(described above by using the gossip from the cloud node).
A dispute message is sent to the cloud node to force the
edge node to respond, and if it does not, then a punishment
procedure starts.
Availability attacks such as an edge node that delays
responding to messages (but responds correctly) to degrade
the system performance are more complicated and remain as
an open problem.
V. LSMERKLE DESIGN
In this section, we extend WedgeChain with a data indexing
structure that enables accessing the key-value pairs in the log
through a key-value interface of get and put operations.
Our proposal provides an index on top of WedgeChain that
is both efficient and trusted. This means that a potentially
malicious edge node can respond to client requests without
having to involve the cloud node. Our data index—called
LSMerkle—builds upon mLSM [32] and extends it to work
in the edge-cloud environment of WedgeChain and to support
lazy (asynchronous) certification. Specifically, LSMerkle uses
mLSM as the data structure and builds around it a protocol
to coordinate with clients and the cloud node the update and
compaction operations as well as integrating a WedgeChain
log/buffer as the memory component to allow Phase I Commit
with asynchronous trust.
A. System and Data Model
The indexing structure extends WedgeChain. This means
that it inherits the system model of WedgeChain that consists
of clients, edge nodes and a cloud node. The LSMerkle tree
is stored in the edge node and its interface consists of:
• put(IN: key, value, OUT: block, bid): this request takes a
key-value pair and applies it to the index. The return values
are ones that correspond to the block where the key-value
pair are added.
• get(IN: key, OUT: value, index proof): This call returns
the value of the requested key and a proof of the authen-
ticity of the response. We provide more details about the
index proof, but at a high-level it consists of certified parts
of the index that prove that the value is part of the index. It
also includes certifications similar to log read Phase I and
Phase II Commits.
B. LSMerkle Design
We propose LSM Merkle tree (LSMerkle), a data index-
ing structure that can be integrated into WedgeChain and
utilize lazy (asynchronous) certification. LSMerkle builds on
mLSM [32] that combines techniques from LSM trees (for
fast ingestion) and Merkle trees (for trusted data access). The
immutable-nature of updates in mLSM enables us to extend
it to support lazy certification and overcome the problem of
baseline solutions (Section II-C).
Structure and configuration. The structure of the
LSMerkle tree consists of n levels—structured in the same
way as a LSM tree. Each level has a threshold number of
pages, i.e., the threshold of level i, Li, is |Li| pages. A page
represents the updates in a block. The first level, L0, resides in
memory and contains the most recent updates to the LSMerkle
tree. Each page consists of put operations in addition to meta-
information such as the range of keys in the page and a
timestamp of the time the page was created.
For the rest of this section, we assume that the number
of levels is 3 and the threshold number of pages per level
are: 2 for levels L0 and L1, and 4 for L2. This is not a
practical configuration, but is chosen for ease of exposition
and to simplify the presented examples.
Merklizing LSM. The state of a LSMerkle tree is shown
in Figure 3(a). Each block in the figure contains two put
operations (xi denotes the i
th version of the key x.) Level
L0 in LSMerkle is a WedgeChain log/buffer as described in
Section IV, which allows Phase I Commit blocks of key-value
operation using asynchronous trust before they are compacted
by the cloud. The LSMerkle tree maintains a hash for each
page in L0. This hash is certified by the cloud node through





















































Fig. 3: LSMerkle tree sample state and example operations.
blocks for add() operations. For every other level in the
LSMerkle tree, a Merkle tree is maintained. For example, if
L1 has two pages, then it has a Merkle tree, LSMi, consisting
of two leaf nodes, where each leaf node contains the hash of
a page. The Merkle root of LSMi is certified by the cloud
node. LSMerkle maintains a global root that is the hash of all
Merkle roots.
Put operations. When a block is ready to be inserted in
the log, it is also added as a new page in L0. The new
page contains the put data operations. The certification of
the block in log and the certification of the hash of its
corresponding page in L0 are going to be done through the
same block-certify and block-proof message exchange with
the cloud node. Operations on pages in L0 would leverage lazy
(asynchronous) certification in the same way it is leveraged for
put operations.
Merging If the number of pages in the edge node exceeds
the threshold in L0, then all pages in L0 are merged with
the pages in the next level, L1. More generally, when the
number of pages in level Li exceeds |Li|, the pages in Li
are merged with the pages in Li+1. The merge protocol is an
asynchronous protocol that does not interfere with the normal
operation of the LSMerkle tree. Consider a merge of pages
from Li into pages in Li+1. The edge node sends a copy
of all pages undergoing the merge in Li and Li+1 and the
corresponding Merkle tree hashes to the cloud node. When the
cloud node receives the pages, it verifies the authenticity of the
pages and their state by checking the associated certification
proofs. Then, it performs the merge of the pages, similar to
how a LSM tree merge is performed. The resulting merged
pages replace the old pages.
The cloud node computes the new level’s Merkle tree to
derive the corresponding Merkle root and global root. Then,
the cloud node sends back the new pages for in addition to
the signed Merkle root for the changed levels and a new
signed global root. When the edge node receives the merge
response, it replaces the pages undergoing the merge with the
new merged pages. Also, the Merkle roots and global root are
updated with the received ones.
Reading. Like an LSM tree, the LSMerkle might have
redundant versions of the same key. It is possible that the same
key has multiple versions in different pages in L0. Also, a key
might have versions in more than one level. However, levels
other than L0 are guaranteed to have at most one version of
each key because the redundancies are removed in the merge
process. The read algorithm should take these redundancies
in consideration to ensure that only the most recent version
is returned. This is trivial in regular LSM trees. However,
in LSMerkle, we need to return the most recent version in
addition to a proof that it is indeed the most recent version.
To prove that a returned version of a key is the most recent
one, the edge node must provide a proof that all pages in L0
and pages in other levels do not have a more recent version.
Consider the case when the edge node finds the most recent
version in a page p in L0. In this case, the edge node only
needs to send the page p in addition to the other pages in
L0. The client checks that the returned p has the most recent
version by reading the other L0 pages. There is no need to
return pages at other levels because even if they contain other
versions of the key, they are guaranteed to be older versions.
Now, consider the case when the most recent version is in
page p in level Li, for i > 0. The edge node returns p. Also,
it needs to return a proof that every level Lj , where j < i,
does not contain a more recent version of the key. All pages in
L0 need to be returned in the response because they all might
have a more recent version of the key than the one in Li. For
other levels between L0 and Li, the edge node needs to return
the page that has the range that contains the key. For example,
in Lj (0 < j < i), keys are sorted across pages. Only one page
has the range that include the key. The edge node returns such
page for each level between L0 and Li. Each page contains
special values called min and max that denote the minimum
and maximum keys in the range of that page. We enforce that
the first page has a min of 0 and the last page has a max
of infinity. Also, every two consecutive pages px and py have
the invariant that px.max = py.min− 1. This ensures that a
client can use the min and max to verify that the key it is
looking for is not in any other page in that level.
When the client receives the response from the edge node,
it verifies the authenticity of the response and that the returned
version is indeed the most recent one from the returned
state. Afterwards the read terminates. Some of the returned
blocks might not have been certified by the cloud node in
the response. In this case, the read is considered in the Phase
I Commit. The client waits for the block-proof to enter the
Phase II Commit.
If the key does not exist, then the edge node returns the
intersecting pages from all levels in addition to all pages in
L0 to the client with their corresponding Merkle roots and
global root.
C. Example
We now present an example of doing put, merge and read
operations on the LSMerkle in Figure 3(a). The first example
is of adding a new block with new values of keys x (x4) and
w (w3). This is shown as the new page (shaded with the color
red) in Figure 3(b). This new block triggers a merge request
since the number of blocks in L0 exceeds the threshold of two
blocks. Figure 3(c) shows the outcome of the merge operation.
The edge node sends all the blocks in L0 and L1 to the cloud
node, and the cloud node responds with the merged blocks.
The edge node updates the tree by emptying L0 and L1 and
adding the received merged blocks to L1. The Merkle tree for
L1 and the global root are updated to reflect the changes (all
changes in the LSMerkle are represented with the components
shaded with the color red.)
Figure 3(d) shows an example of reading the key q. (we
assume that there are two blocks added in L0 before the read.)
Since the most recent value of the key is in L2, the edge node
returns the intersecting pages in both L1 and L2 along with
their corresponding partial Merkle trees. The edge node also
sends all the pages in L0 in addition to the signed global root.
(all the components that form the response to the read request
are shaded with the color green.)
D. Read Data Freshness
The LSMerkle algorithms ensures that the returned value is
one that has been added in the past and is part of a consistent
snapshot of the LSMerkle tree. However, LSMerkle does not
guarantee that the read is going to return the most recent value.
This is because an edge node might serve the read from a
stale snapshot of the data. Enforcing that a read would return
the most recent value requires extensive coordination between
clients, edge nodes and the cloud node, which we view as
prohibitive. Alternatively, we propose a guarantee of reading
from a freshness window. For example, a guarantee that the
read returns the state from a consistent snapshot as of a time no
longer than X seconds ago. To enforce this freshness property,
the following changes need to be applied to our algorithms:
(1) The cloud node timestamps the global root of each merged
LSMerkle. The signature would be of both the timestamp and
the global root.
(2) When a client receives a read response, it also checks
the timestamp of the received global root and verify its
authenticity using the signature. If the timestamp is within the
freshness window, the client accepts the response. Otherwise,
it retries the request.
An issue may arise if updates are not happening frequently
enough to trigger updating the global root by the cloud node.
In such a case, the edge node can add no-op operations to
trigger merges more rapidly and reconstruct the LSMerkle tree.
Effect of time synchronization bounds. Another issue
is that of clock synchronization. Depending on the distance
between nodes, current time synchronization technologies
achieve synchronization with an accuracy of 10s to 100s of
milliseconds. This limits the use of our technique to the bounds
of time synchronization.
An alternative to the method we present above is to maintain
more state information at the client side (e.g., similar to
client-side session consistency solutions) that would allow a
client to check whether the read state is consistent and fresh
C O V I M
C 0 19 61 141 238
TABLE I: The average Round-Trip Times in milliseconds between
California and other datacenters.
by checking with its local client-side information. Another
alternative is to establish a secure communication channel
between the client and the cloud node to verify freshness.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We present a performance evaluation of WedgeChain in
this section. To emulate edge-cloud coordination, we run our
experiments across geographically distributed Amazon AWS
datacenters. In most of our experiments, one datacenter—
California (C)—will act as the edge location, hosting clients
and edge nodes and another datacenter—Virginia (V )—will
host the cloud node. We vary the place of the edge and cloud
nodes in some experiments across datacenters in California
(C), Virginia (V ), Oregon (O), Ireland (I), and Mumbai (M ).
The Round-Trip Times (RTTs) between the four datacenters
range between 19ms and 238ms (Table I.) In each datacenter
we use Amazon EC2 m5d.xlarge machines. Each machine
runs Linux and have 4 virtualized CPUs and 16 GB memory.
We compare with a baseline that processes all requests in
the cloud node. We call this baseline, cloud-only. We also
compare with a baseline where all requests are certified first
at the cloud and then sent to the edge node. This is the baseline
we described in Section II-C. We call this baseline the edge-
baseline. The cloud-only baseline represents the case where
clients can fully trust the results since no edge nodes are
involved in processing them. However, clients incur the wide-
area latency to the cloud for every request. The edge-baseline,
on the other hand, represents the current way of utilizing
untrusted nodes for data access, where data is certified first
in the trusted node (the cloud node in our case) and then sent
to the untrusted node (the edge node in our case.) In the edge-
baseline implementation we tested with both a vanilla Merkle
Tree as well as a mLSM as the trusted index component.
The choice of the index did not have a significant effect on
performance as the edge-cloud coordination dominated the
performance overhead. The results shown are for using mLSM
as the index in edge-baseline.
We use key-value operations in our experiments since it
affects both logging and indexing components. We batch
add and put requests in all experiments. Unless mentioned
otherwise, each batch consists of 100 put operations, and the
size of the value of each operation is 100 bytes. Each edge
node maintains one partition of the data, which consists of
100,000 key-value pairs. In the experiments, we report the
performance of one partition. The LSMerkle tree has four
levels. The thresholds for the levels are 10, 10, 100, and 1000
pages for levels 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
A. Baseline Performance of Put Operations
In Figure 4, we vary the batch (i.e., block) size from 100
to 2000 operations per batch. Figure 4(a) shows the latency















































Fig. 4: The performance of Put operations while varying the block
size
below 20ms. This latency corresponds to the Phase I Commit
latency. This low latency is expected since it is the time needed
to communicate with the nearby edge node. On the other hand,
Cloud-only incurs a latency around 80ms which corresponds
roughly to the round-trip time from California to Virginia in
addition to the processing overhead. Edge-baseline also incurs
a cost due to having to wait for the response from the cloud
which leads to a latency higher than 100ms in all cases. Edge-
baseline performs worse than Cloud-only due to the need to
involve the edge node in the commitment of the block which
requires more time.
As we increase the batch size, the latency increases slightly
for WedgeChain from 15ms to 20ms and Cloud-only from
78ms to 83ms. However, Edge-baseline is affected signifi-
cantly by the increase in the batch size resulting in increasing
the latency from 109ms to 213ms. The reason for this increase
is that both the edge node and cloud node are involved in the
commitment of the block and are in the path of execution,
which leads to stressing the network bandwidth resources
faster than the other two approaches. WedgeChain masks the
effect of this edge-cloud coordination by utilizing the concept
of lazy (asynchronous) certification that removes the cloud
node from the path of execution when adding blocks or
performing put operations.
Throughput results are shown in Figure 4(b). Due to
WedgeChain’s low latency, throughput increases from 6.6K
operations/s to roughly 100K operations/s, which is a 15x
increase that results from multiplying the batch size 20
times (from 100 to 2000 operations per block.) Cloud-only’s
throughput experiences a 18.5x increase when varying the
batch size from 100 to 2000 operations. The poor latency
performance of Edge-baseline causes the throughput to scale
poorly, where the throughput only doubles when increasing
the block size from 100 to 2000 operations.
B. Multi-Client and Mixed Workload
Figure 5 shows experiment results while varying the number
of clients and read-to-write ratio. Figure 5(a) presents experi-
ments with an 100%-write workload while varying the number
of clients from 1 to 9. Increasing the number of clients allows
more concurrency. This leads to an increase in throughput
by 22–30% for WedgeChain and Edge-baseline. However, the































































(c) All-read workload (d) Best-case read latency and veri-
fication overhead
Fig. 5: Results of multi-client and mixed workload experiments
Cloud-only to catch up to WedgeChain throughput and be
only 7% lower than the throughput of WedgeChain. The main
reason for this is that by increasing the number of clients,
Cloud-only is offsetting the overhead of communication (edge-
cloud latency) while not incurring the communication and
computations overheads of WedgeChain. On the other hand,
Edge-baseline suffers from the synchronous communication
overhead which causes its latency to be the lowest out of the
three.
Figure 5(b) shows experiments with a mixed workload of
50% reads and 50% writes. In this experiment, writes are
buffered, but reads are interactive (we show a case that stresses
read performance later in Figure 5(d)). Interactive reads are
very expensive for Cloud-only as each read requires the client
to wait for the response that takes a duration proportional to the
edge-cloud latency. This causes the throughput of Cloud-only
to reach only 270 operations/s while WedgeChain achieves
4K operations/s and Edge-baseline achieves 1.3K operations/s.
The reason for Edge-baseline achieving a lower performance
than WedgeChain is due to the 50% writes that incur the
synchronous coordination overhead.
Figure 5(c) shows experiments with a read-only workload.
In this experiment, WedgeChain and Edge-baseline perform
similarly. In both solutions, interactive read operations in-
volve the same steps of communication and verification for
WedgeChain and Edge-baseline. However, Cloud-only re-
quires communication with the cloud and since interactive
reads requires the client to wait until the read is served, this
leads to a high overhead and achieving a small fraction of the
performance of WedgeChain and Edge-baseline.
The significant difference between the read performance of
WedgeChain and Edge-baseline on the one hand and Cloud-


























Fig. 6: Comparing the Phase I and Phase II commit rates.
only does not incur the complex computations needed in
edge nodes since its results are trusted. This would enable
the cloud node to process more reads than what the edge
nodes can process. Observing this while increasing the number
of clients is challenging as it would require emulating a
huge number of clients. Instead, we perform an experiment
in Figure 5(d) where we measure the best-case read latency
directly at the cloud node for Cloud-only and at the edge
node for the others. WedgeChain and Edge-baseline achieves a
similar read performance of 0.71ms, 0.19ms of which is due to
the verification overhead performed at the client. Cloud-only,
on the other hand, achieves a better latency of 0.5ms without
incurring a verification overhead as the results are trusted.
C. Asynchronous Certification and Commit Phases
The performance advantage of WedgeChain is due in a large
part to the concept of lazy (asynchronous) certification that dis-
tinguishes between two phases of commitment. In this section,
we provide more insights about lazy certification by showing
the relation between the two phases of commitment. Figure 6
shows the results of three experiments, each for a different
batch size. In each experiment, WedgeChain commits 4000
batches (blocks). The figure shows how rapidly the batches
are being committed by plotting the number of committed
batches against the x-axis that represents time.
For the case of 100 operations per batch (B=100), the rates
of both Phase I Commit (P1) and Phase II Commit (P2) are
similar—the two plots are overlapping and the 4000 batches
are committed within 60 seconds. This means that although
Phase II Commit takes more time, it is happening at the same
rate of the Phase I Commit. This is different when we start
increasing the batch size. For the case of 500 operations/batch
(B=500), there is a difference in the rate of P1 and P2 commits.
P1 commit is still fast; committing the 4000 batches within
60s. However, P2 commits take more than 100s. The reason for
this is that the buffering and processing of larger batch sizes
lead the P2 throughput to be lower than the P1 throughput.
This is the same case with larger batch sizes, such as the third
experiment with 1000 operations/batch (B=1000).
The main takeaway of this set of experiments is the behavior
of P1 and P2 commits and how WedgeChain is able to
mask both the latency and throughput overhead of edge-cloud
communication. Notice that in all cases, the P1 commit is
still able to commit the 4000 batches in close to 60s, even








































(b) Varying the edge node location
Fig. 7: The latency of committing blocks of Put operations while
varying the location of the cloud and edge nodes.
certification that we desire, which is masking the overhead
of expensive edge-cloud coordination and enjoying the low
latency and high performance that can be delivered by the
nearby edge node.
D. The Effect of Edge-to-Cloud and Client-to-Edge Latency
The performance advantage of WedgeChain relies on the
close proximity of clients and edge nodes, which masks the
wide-area latency between the clients and the cloud node.
Therefore, the magnitude of the performance advantage de-
pends on the relative communication latency between the
client and the edge node on one hand, and the communication
latency between the edge node and the cloud node on the
other hand. To measure the effects of these relative latencies,
we performed two sets of experiments that vary the locations
of the edge and cloud nodes.
Figure 7(a) shows the latency while varying the location
of the cloud node and fixing the locations of the client and
edge node in California. WedgeChain is able to preserve the
latency benefit of utilizing an edge node—the latency in all
cases is within 15ms and 17ms. This shows that it successfully
masks the wide-area latency even in cases when the round-
trip time to the cloud node is 238ms (between California
and Mumbai). Cloud-only is affected by the location of the
cloud node since all requests are served by the cloud node.
The latency for Cloud-only ranges between 37ms and 247ms,
which corresponds to the round-trip latency to the cloud node.
This is also the case for Edge-baseline where the latency
ranges between 59ms and 321ms. Edge-baseline performs
worse than Cloud-only due to the bandwidth and computation
stress incurred to synchronously coordinate between the edge
and cloud nodes as we observed in the previous experiments.
Figure 7(b) varies the location of the edge node while
fixing the client in California and the cloud node in Mumbai.
WedgeChain latency is affected directly by the location of
the edge node, since that is where requests are committed.
WedgeChain’s latency vary between 17ms (when the edge
node is in Oregon) and 247ms (when the edge node is in
Mumbai). The latency in all cases corresponds to the round-
trip latency from the client to the edge node. Cloud-only
does not utilize an edge node and thus experiences the same
performance in all cases, which corresponds to the latency
from the client to the cloud node. Edge-baseline incurs a
similar latency in all cases while varying the location of the
edge node except for the case when the edge node is co-located
with the cloud node. The reason for the similarity in all cases
except an edge in Mumbai is because the sum of the latencies
between the client, the edge, and cloud nodes are similar.
This makes the total time spent for communication be similar.
Additionally, in these cases, an additional overhead is incurred
for edge-cloud coordination as we observed in the evaluations
above. The reason for achieving a better performance when
the edge node is co-located with the cloud node is that the
overhead of edge-cloud coordination diminishes, leaving the
communication cost to be the only dominating cost for latency.
This is why the latency of Edge-baseline is similar to both
Cloud-only and WedgeChain.
In all cases, WedgeChain outperform both Cloud-only and
edge-baseline except for the case when the edge node is co-
located with the cloud node. When the edge node is co-located
with the cloud node, all three systems perform similarly.
E. Dataset Size
Here, we vary the size of the key range from 100K to 100M
keys. Although we target edge-cloud environments where
we expect that edge partitions would be small, we perform
this evaluation to test the effect of the size of the partition.
Increasing to 100M keys, we do not observe a significant effect
on write performance. WedgeChain achieves a latency between
15–16ms, Edge-baseline achieves a latency between 88–95ms,
and Cloud-only achieves a latency of 78–79ms across all cases.
The reason for this is that the communication and verification
overheads (in the order of 10s of milliseconds) outweigh the
potential I/O overhead caused by increasing the database size
(in the order of milliseconds or less).
VII. RELATED WORK
Edge-cloud data management is the area of utilizing edge
nodes [13], [33] that are closer to user to perform data man-
agement tasks to augment existing cloud deployments [16],
[22], [26], [27], [34] This area is also related to early work in
mobile data management [17], [31], [35]. WedgeChain shares
the goal of utilizing edge resources for data management. The
distinguishing feature of WedgeChain compared to this set of
work is that it considers a byzantine fault-tolerance model
where the edge nodes are not trusted.
Coordination with untrusted nodes (Byzantine fault-
tolerance) [20], [30] has been investigated extensively in the
context of data systems [8], [10], [14], [15], [18], [19], [21],
[36] and databases [12], [23], [28], and is recently gaining
renewed interest due to emerging blockchain and cryptocur-
rency applications [4]–[7], [9], [11]. WedgeChain contribution
to this body of work is (1) the introduction of the concept of
lazy (asynchronous) certification to byzantine fault-tolerance.
Existing byzantine fault-tolerance protocols require extensive
communication and coordination to prevent malicious activ-
ity, which makes them infeasible in real scenarios. Lazy
certification makes a shift from a paradigm of “preventing”
malicious activity that is expensive, to a paradigm of “detect
and eventually punish” that allows better performance. (2) our
work also tackles the unique challenges that arise from edge-
cloud systems such as a hybrid trust model, edge-cloud trusted
indexing, and asymmetric coordination.
WedgeChain’s index, LSMerkle, builds on mLSM [32] that
combines features of both LSM trees [24], [29] and Merkle
trees [25] to produce a fast-ingestion trusted data index. The
choice of building on mLSM is due to its append-only and
immutable nature that makes it amenable to be integrated
into WedgeChain’s lazy certification method. LSMerkle uses
mLSM as the data structure at the edge and builds an
asynchronous (lazy) certification protocol around it to enable
coordinating updates and compaction with the trusted cloud
node. LSMerkle also integrates a WedgeChain log/buffer as a
replacement to the memory component of mLSM to enable
incoming key-value requests to be Phase I Committed with
lazy (asynchronous) certification. If mLSM is used with no
changes in an edge-cloud environment, then it would resemble
the baseline (Sections II-C) in that each put operation must go
to the cloud node first before being part of the state in the edge
nodes. LSMerkle, on the other hand, allows lazy certification
where put operations can be Phase I Committed on the
(untrusted) edge nodes without involving the (trusted) cloud
node. The same is true for get operations where LSMerkle
modifies the protocol for get operations to allow reading
Phase I committed data. To allow these extensions, LSMerkle
builds a protocol around mLSM to perform put, get, and
merge operations. This protocol enables a pattern of Phase
I committing locally at the edge and then coordinating with
the cloud for Phase II commit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
WedgeChain is an edge-cloud system that tolerates mali-
cious edge nodes. WedgeChain’s main innovations are (1) a
lazy (asynchronous) certification strategy. Lazy certification
allows edge nodes to lie—however, it also guarantees that a
lie is going to be discovered. With proper penalties when
malicious acts are discovered, the guarantee of eventually
catching the lie would deter edge nodes from acting mali-
ciously. (2) WedgeChain takes the trusted cloud node out of the
execution path and minimizes edge-cloud coordination using
data-free coordination. (3) We propose the LSMerkle tree that
extends mLSM [32] to support trusted fast-ingestion indexing
while utilizing WedgeChain’s features of lazy certification and
data-free coordination.
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